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The 20 October 2021 marks the first anniversary of the shooting of unarmed 
protesters by the Nigerian military. The movement pushing to abolish the 
Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) has proved how social media can make 
the voices of the weak heard. However, recent developments surrounding 
social media regulations in the aftermath of the shooting show that the right 
to freedom of expression is at risk of regression. 
 • The EndSARS protest has proven itself to be a milestone people-led movement. 
It is the first time Nigerians from different classes, ethnic groups, and religions 
have united behind a cause. It went beyond making demands for the mere dis-
banding of the SARS squad to insisting on the release of protesters, justice for 
victims, prosecution of poor police conduct, evaluation and retraining of of-
ficers, and an increase in police salary – all organised via social media.
 • What came in the aftermath of the movement served as a driver for the renewed 
calls for bills to regulate social media. The political elite issued a communiqué 
that called for the strict monitoring and censorship of social media usage. 
 • Recent developments are not unique. A careful analysis of social media regula-
tions shows that the government has remained ambivalent towards freedom of 
expression – promoting that right while at the same time limiting it.  
Policy Implications
Nigeria has witnessed some progress since it transitioned from military to civil-
ian rule in 1999. Nevertheless, it risks regression if draconian bills are introduced 
that curtail freedom of expression and assembly. The Nigerian government must 
be willing to review and revise its cyber bills to eliminate ambiguity. It must also 
include all relevant stakeholders, such as youth, women, and human as well as 
digital rights experts, in its drafting of cyber bills.
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The Role of Social Media in Social Movements 
EndSARS is by no means unique because such social movements have long been a 
means through which the oppressed have expressed their grievances. Social move-
ments are generally understood as mobilising and uniting large groups of people in 
protest against specific social and political issues. Early forms of social movements 
were designed as mass protests to contest an issue and are popularly organised as 
demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins, picketing, and sometimes outright violence. 
Although among the most popular and well-known social movements were 
those that called for women’s suffrage and for civil rights, Africa and, by exten-
sion, Nigeria have not been exempt from the organising of such social action. Social 
movements have been part and parcel of Nigerian society from the colonial era until 
today. Earlier protests included the Aba’s Women’s riot of 1929 – when Eastern 
region women in colonial Nigeria kicked back against exorbitant taxes levied on 
them. Pa Michael Imodu led another famous protest. It was the biggest union strike 
in 1945, that sought a pay increase. In 1946, the Abeokuta Ladies Club demanded 
of the Alake of Egbaland the abolition of taxes on women. In 1949, the colonial 
police shot dead 21 Iva Valley miners while protesting harsh working conditions. 
These radical movements in the country paved the way for those to come later and 
inspired modern forms of protest in Nigeria.
Although traditional forms of social movement have remained, protests have 
since gone beyond the previous mass gatherings, strikes, picketing, and sit-ins in 
form – partly due to the rise of social media. Therefore, it is difficult to ignore the 
role the latter has played in the evolution of social movements. Since the arrival 
of social media, there is no doubt that the success rate of social movements has 
increased. Social media has made group mobilisation a lot more seamless. Without 
formal organisation, social media has made it possible for consistent and sustained 
participation even beyond borders – this was not possible before the Internet. Also, 
social media has fostered creativity and innovation regarding social movements. 
For instance, hashtags and memes have proven to be valuable tools in capturing 
audiences’ attention and directing it towards specific movements.
In an age where revolts are taking other forms, especially in using social media 
as a platform to be heard, this article analyses online/online-organised protests as a 
new weapon of the weak – borrowing from James Scott’s (1985) classic Weapons of 
the Weak, which studies hidden everyday forms of peasant resistance in Malaysia. 
Although social media protests are somewhat open – that is, seen by specific net-
works of followers – they have become an everyday tool of resistance for the weak. 
Besides, social media platforms have become an easily accessible forum to air one’s 
perspectives on issues. According to a report by We Are Social and Hootsuite, 57 
per cent of the world’s total “eligible” population now use social networks – which 
means that more people can mobilise and protest online (We are Social and Hoot-
suite 2021). The focus here is precisely the online aspect of the EndSARS protests in 
Nigeria and subsequent attempts to curtail this new weapon: social media.
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The Movement to End the Special Anti-Robbery Squad
Mobile phones (through which most users access the Internet) arrived in Nigeria in 
the mid-1990s. Currently, the country has 122 million Internet users as of May 2019 
(NCC Media Team 2019). As a result, social media has become a popular medium 
through which Nigerians express their discontent with the government. The use of 
social media as a social-movement tool is a relatively recent development. In the 
Arab Spring, social media was regarded as the driving force behind the swift spread 
of revolution across much of the Middle East and North Africa.
Social media has taken on a prominent role in social movements because it 
has served as an effective communication tool. Videos that surfaced on social me-
dia made visible the atrocities committed by Nigeria’s Special Anti-Robbery Squad 
(SARS). Although the demand to end SARS attracted international media attention 
in October 2020, its origins date back to 2016. SARS was created in 1992 to tackle 
the country’s challenges with robbery, vehicle theft, kidnapping, and cattle rustling. 
However, it seemed that the squad designated the protector of lives ended up be-
coming the people’s tormentor instead.
There have been numerous reports of human rights abuses by SARS, includ-
ing illegal “stop and search” practices, illegal arrests and detentions, extrajudicial 
killings, sexual harassment of women, and mistreatment of young, male Nigerians. 
Even though Segun Awosanya, a renowned human rights activist, began the cam-
paign to end SARS and stop the abuses of citizens in 2016, it was largely ignored 
by the government. The calls to end SARS deepened in 2017 when attacks became 
more brazen; thus, the hashtag #EndSARS went viral. A petition signed by 10,195 
people was submitted to the National Assembly and garnered enough support to 
call for SARS’s total disbandment, but the decision was reached for its reform in-
stead (Busari 2017). From 2018, campaigns intensified with celebrities joining the 
cause. Subsequently, intense organisation ensued after a video surfaced of SARS 
police shooting dead a young Nigerian in Delta State on 3 October 2020, with more 
videos coming to the fore. The unfortunate events popularised #EndSARS on social 
media.
The outcry against the death of Nigerians at the hands of SARS proceeded to 
become an active social media movement as protesters continued to force conces-
sions through various online platforms. By 16 October 2020, the hashtag had accu-
mulated 3.3 million tweets (Okunola 2020). It was the number-one trending topic 
on Twitter in several countries. Related hashtags – #EndSARS, #EndPoliceBrutal-
ity, #SARSMustEnd, #EndSARSNow – swept across social media platforms like 
Facebook, Instagram, and, above all, Twitter. As a result of active social media en-
gagement, protests were organised in all six geopolitical zones of Nigeria. Although 
protests like the Aba Women’s Riot of 1929 and the 1945 union strike represented, 
as noted, watershed moments in Nigeria’s history, they differ from EndSARS be-
cause they were isolated incidents not necessarily sweeping the whole country. The 
EndSARS movement marks, then, the first time Nigerians from different classes, 
ethnic groups, and religions united behind a cause.
For a protest without leadership and occurring amidst government suppres-
sion, EndSARS succeeded in systematically organising funds, welfare packages, 
lawyers, doctors, and ambulances at protest sites, including cleaning up after them-
selves at the end of each protest. However, one might wonder: How was a leaderless 
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movement even able to emerge and sustain itself? A number of individuals and 
groups were responsible for mobilising the necessary resources for sustaining the 
protest. Nigerian celebrities were active in using their social media platforms to 
mobilise and organise protests across the country. Such public figures who played 
a crucial role include Falz and DJ Switch in the Lagos State protests, Flavour in 
Anambra State, Kiss Daniel in Ogun State, and Davido in Abuja, to name a few. 
The Feminist Coalition and Flutterwave coordinated fundraising efforts to provide 
medical resources, legal aid, security, food, and water in protest locations. Funds 
came from individuals and groups both within and outside the country. Currently, 
the movement has a website where EndSARS tokens are sold for charity.
The protest moved beyond the shores of the country to Nigerians in the di-
aspora. There were protests in other parts of Africa and beyond, like Canada, the 
Caribbean, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Nigerian celeb-
rities in the diaspora and the Black Lives Matter movement supported the cause. 
The protesters were able to force concessions from the government and had SARS 
“disbanded” on 11 October 2020; however, this declared outcome was rather super-
ficial in reality. Unfortunately, efforts seemed futile when a new unit was instituted 
right after. On 20 October, following violent escalations in Lagos State, Governor 
Babajide Sanwo-Olu declared a curfew, after which people saw laser cameras taken 
down. A few hours later, reports came in that streetlights had gone off, and armed 
soldiers arrived and shot at protesters – the exact number of casualties has not 
yet been ascertained. Despite overwhelming evidence of the shooting, the Nigerian 
government initially ignored, denied, and only reluctantly set up an investigation. 
The African Union only condemned the violence and has been criticised for its 
passive response to the shooting of unarmed protesters. Regardless of the govern-
ment’s attempt to suppress the protest, it has persisted online via other hashtags 
like #EndBadGovernance, #EndJumboPay, and with the slogan Soro Soke (which 
translates to “Speak Up”). 
Given the hashtags used online, EndSARS is a protest that goes beyond ad-
dressing merely police brutality. It is an outcry against decades of bad governance, 
corruption, and mismanagement in a country with abundant resources. A recycled 
political elite has mainly ruled the country; for instance, the current president Mu-
hammadu Buhari also served as the military head of state between 1983 and 1985. 
Thus, although EndSARS began as a movement against police brutality, it has ad-
dressed a larger menace in society. Others have argued that COVID-19 and its com-
pound effects were the straw that broke the camel’s back, propelling the EndSARS 
movement. Based on National Bureau of Statistics data, Nigeria recorded a gross 
domestic product growth of -6.10 per cent in the second quarter of 2020. Subse-
quently, the figure was -3.62 per cent for the third quarter of the same year (Komo-
lafe et al. 2020). Hence, two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth.
However, as predicted in the GIGA’s Ten Things to Watch in Africa in 2021, the 
movement did not proceed unsuppressed. In addition to the shooting of unarmed 
civilians, the president also banned public protests; curfews were instituted across 
the nation too. Although the government has denied most of the allegations, several 
protesters reported that their bank accounts were frozen by the Central Bank of Ni-
geria; others accused the government of putting them on a “no-fly list.” At the same 
time, some have found themselves threatened by unknown individuals (Akinkuotu 
and Adepegba 2020). As a consequence of the EndSARS protest, there have been 
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intensified calls for the regulation of social media. Although cloaked under the nar-
rative of monitoring “hate speech,” most Nigerians view this as a means of clamping 
down on freedom of speech and online protest. 
Freedom of Expression: Progression or Regression? 
The right to freedom of expression is simply the ability of an individual to speak 
freely without censorship, sanction, or imprisonment. Freedom of expression is a 
fundamental human right guaranteed in the Nigerian Constitution, African Char-
ter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), and other relevant international treaties – all of which Nigeria is a signa-
tory to. Article 19 of the UDHR states that:
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart in-
formation and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers (UN General 
Assembly, 1948).
This right is further protected in the Nigerian Constitution, Article 39(1): 
Every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including (the) freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interfer-
ence (Nigeria, 1999).
It is fair to say that Nigeria has witnessed some progress since the transition from 
military to civilian rule on the right to free expression. In 1984, the country had 
Decree No 4, which made it a criminal offence to publish any material considered 
embarrassing or against the government’s interests – as defined on all counts by 
the regime itself. A military tribunal tried offenders. It was the most dreaded and 
repressive law in the country – interestingly, one enacted under the current presi-
dent’s military regime. Since the 1990s, when Nigeria first began to experience a 
surge in Internet use, the government has instituted several censorship bills to tack-
le Internet security, data privacy, and other cyber activities. However, a review of 
these bills and acts, including the government’s reaction to freedom of expression, 
demonstrates its ambivalent attitude on the latter right. It stands by its commit-
ment to upholding the freedom of expression cemented in the Constitution while 
simultaneously enacting bills and acts that jeopardise that same right. A tragic ex-
ample of this infringement is the events that led to the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa, 
an environmental activist who chose to exercise his right to free speech and as-
sembly.
The year 2015 marked the beginning of attempts by lawmakers to regulate 
social media in Nigeria. Using this point in time as a benchmark, one can trace 
the proposed and passed bills/acts before and after either directly or indirectly at-
tempting to regulate social media. Some of the pre-2015 bills and acts include: 
 • Sections 373, 375, and 376 of Nigeria’s Criminal Code Act, as well as the Defam-
atory and Offensive Publications Act – both of which criminalises defamation 
and to some extent limit freedom of expression both on- and offline 
 • The 2005 Computer Security and Infrastructure Bill
 • The 2008 Electronic provisions Bill
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 • The 2011 Cyber Security Bill
 • The 2011 Electronic Transfer of Funds Crime Bill
 • The 2011 Criminal Code Amendment for Offences Relating to Computer Misuse 
and Cybercrimes
The only law enacted has been the Criminal Code Act, which originates from the 
1916 criminal code and adapts some African common laws. The rest did not make it 
through the lawmaking process, except in 2011 when the Evidence Act was amend-
ed to allow electronic evidence’s admissibility.
The Nigerian government first ventured into regulating social media with the 
2015 Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, Etc) Act. The provision that set out the 
rules for social media use was labelled “Cyberstalking.”
Any person who knowingly or intentionally sends a message or other matter by 
means of computer systems or network that he knows to be false for the purpose 
of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal 
intimidation, enmity, hatred, ill will or needless anxiety to another or causes such 
a message to be sent: commits an offence under this Act and shall be liable on con-
viction to a fine of not more than ₦7,000,000.00 or imprisonment for a term of 
not more than 3 years or to both such fine and imprisonment (Nigeria: Cybercrime 
Act, 2015).
The ambivalent attitude of the government is observed in the bills introduced and 
enacted between 2015 and 2016. The Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, Etc) 
Act was promoted as an instrument for protecting national security. However, since 
the law came into force, Nigerians have reported a series of arrests and detentions 
concerning bloggers and journalists who criticised politicians and business people 
online. When arrested, these individuals are usually charged with the crime of 
cyber stalking detailed above. For instance, on 8 August 2016, armed operatives of 
the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) arrested a blogger named 
Abubakar Sadiq Usman on the grounds of cyberstalking. This arrest followed the 
blogger’s regular posting of content described as “offensive publications” by the 
EFCC. In the same month, another blogger, Azare Musa Babale, was arrested for 
using his social media accounts (Facebook and Twitter) to criticise the policies of 
Bauchi State governor Muhammad Abdullah Abubakar (Vareba, Nwinaene, and 
Theophilus 2017: 28).
In the same year, shortly after the passage of the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, 
Prevention, Etc) Act, Nigeria attempted to pass another controversial bill too: the 
Frivolous Petitions (Prohibition, Etc) Bill. Activists and civil society expressed con-
cern about this bill because its provisions included the following:
Where any person through text messages, tweets, WhatsApp, or through any so-
cial media post any abusive statement knowing same to be false with intent to set 
the public against any person and/ or group of persons, an institution of Govern-
ment or such other bodies established by law shall be guilty of an offence and upon 
conviction shall be liable to an imprisonment for two years or a fine of ₦2,000,000 
or both such fine and imprisonment (Paradigm Initiative 2015).
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Hereafter came the Digital Rights and Freedom Bill of 2016. In contrast to the Friv-
olous Petitions (Prohibition, Etc) Bill, this new legislation was considered progres-
sive and garnered the support of citizens, civil society, and human rights activists. 
The bill aims at protecting Internet users from infringement of their fundamental 
rights. However, in 2019, the bill was rejected by President Buhari on the grounds 
that it “covers too many technical subjects and fails to address any of them exten-
sively” (Olasupo 2020).
With the EndSARS movement beginning to gain intense support and online 
voices growing louder, there has been a revived call by most of the political elite 
to regulate social media. In 2019, two Nigerian senators sponsored the Prohibi-
tion of Hate Speech Bill and the Protection from Internet Falsehood and Manipula-
tion Bill (Nigeria: Protection from Internet Falsehood and Manipulation Bill 2019). 
However, these bills address most of the issues already raised in the Cybercrimes 
(Prohibition, Prevention, Etc) Act. Besides, their emergence has raised heightened 
concerns over potential human rights infringements. Some of the stipulations are 
ambiguous, yet they will potentially have grave consequences. For instance, Part 2, 
subclause 3 (1) states that a person must not engage in acts in or outside of Nigeria 
that “diminishes public confidence in the performance of any duty or function of, or 
in the exercise of any power of the government.” Offenders will be fined not more 
than NGN 300,000, receive a three-year jail sentence, or both. The proposed bill 
became so controversial that an online petition against it acquired 900,000 signa-
tures (Agoi 2020). The bill has passed the second reading in the Senate and is cur-
rently awaiting a committee report to proceed. With the street protests in October 
2020, there were renewed calls for the regulation of social media by some Northern 
Region governors, ministers, and National Assembly leadership.
The Nigerian government exhibits an ambivalent attitude towards the right to 
freedom of expression. The West African state is party to several – if not all – human 
rights treaties while simultaneously proposing bills that ultimately gag a freedom it 
claims to uphold. In February 2021, some protesters were arrested when they came 
out against the decision to reopen the Lekki toll gate (site of the 20 October 2020 
massacre) and hand it back to the Lekki Concession Company while the investiga-
tion of the events of that day was still ongoing. These arrests breached Sections 40 
and 41 of the Nigerian Constitution on the right to free assembly and speech. 
The most recent episode of clamping down on social media is the Twitter ban in 
the country, which followed the deletion by that platform of a tweet by the president 
for violating its terms of use. Some lawmakers have also initiated talks about a code 
of conduct for Nigerian media. Although the bills are cloaked under the progressive 
values of clamping down on disinformation and fake news, most perceive them to 
be instruments of political intimidation instead. These unfolding incidents seem 
to put Nigeria ultimately on a path of regression regarding freedom of expression.
Securing the Right to Freedom of Expression 
Internet regulation is crucial for security reasons; however, it appears that control 
of social media is becoming a prominent aspiration for Nigeria’s political elite, be-
ing less about securing national security and more about political intimidation and 
ensuring human rights violations receive reduced coverage. In addition to the online 
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outcry against the move to initiate questionable social media bills, many individu-
als, groups, and organisations have already spoken out against the trajectory of the 
Nigerian government on freedom of expression. For instance, Paradigm Initiative, a 
non-governmental organisation that advocates for digital rights, has been at the fore-
front of proposing bills that take human rights into account. Following the nation-
wide Twitter ban, the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project, another 
NGO, filed a lawsuit against the suspension of that social media platform and the 
criminalisation of its users in Nigeria. Amnesty International has also criticised the 
government for its social media regulations, while the Economic Community of West 
African States court also ruled that the government cannot prosecute Twitter users.
Modern social movements have shown the extent to which social media can 
be used for peaceful civic engagement and collective action. Nigeria has, as noted, 
witnessed some progress since it transitioned from military to civilian rule in 1999. 
Nevertheless, it risks further regression if draconian bills on freedom of expression 
are put in place. Although the naming and shaming of the government by Nige-
rians, human rights groups, and related organisations may contest and delay its 
acceptance as law, paradoxically, the power to secure the right to freedom of ex-
pression remains in the hands of those same state legislators and institutions that 
tend to breach this right. There is no doubt that some form of Internet regulation 
is necessary to monitor and mitigate cyber terrorism, extremism, and scamming, 
considering the country’s Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen menace. Nevertheless, 
there seems to be duplication regarding clauses that currently regulate Internet use. 
Moreover, a significant flaw in these bills is that they risk being open to interpreta-
tion, and such loopholes can be utilised to violate human rights. As it stands, the 
Nigerian government has lost any trust it had left in it from among the masses, 
especially the youth. To minimise this friction, it must prove that these bills are 
indeed essential for national security. 
To win some of the people’s confidence back, there are two potential options go-
ing forwards. First, the government must have a vested interest in and willingness 
to revisit cyber and social media bills to ensure that they do protect the rights of the 
people while safeguarding national security. The government must institute the re-
vision of the Protection from Internet Falsehood and Manipulation Bill, already go-
ing through the lawmaking process, and the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, 
Etc) Act. Earlier instances of ambiguous clauses must undergo extensive revision 
to make them explicit, thus eliminating loopholes. The clauses in the bills ought to 
provide complete clarity on what exactly falls within the scope of danger, injury, or 
obstruction. For instance, policies introduced by the government must be catego-
rised as issues sensitive to public opinion. Thus, the government must take a proac-
tive approach in reviewing and revising the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, 
Etc) Act. A single bill that addresses all Internet-related issues will suffice. Bills that 
originate from 1916 laws must now make way for twenty-first century legislation.
Second, the drafting of new bills should include respective social groups, espe-
cially youth and women. The drafting should be done in cooperation with human 
rights lawyers and digital rights activists – as well as NGOs like Paradigm Initiative. 
Alternatively, lawmakers have the option of recalling the 2016 Digital Rights and 
Freedom Bill. This bill should serve as the legislative basis securing the individual 
and press rights that may be at risk of breach due to loopholes. Finally, Nigerians 
must take voting more seriously in 2023; the history of government to date proves 
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that the same leaders have ruled Nigeria since independence. A new crop of leaders 
will be vital to change the current trajectory and to secure the rights to freedom of 
expression and assembly.
Practise What You Preach
The EndSARS protest will be recorded as a historical moment in Nigeria. Although 
there had been several social movements in the country before this one, it is the first 
time that Nigerians from all classes, ethnic groups, and religions have united behind 
a cause. Social media has served as a crucial tool for mobilisation and organisation, 
not just within the country but outside of it, and become vital for civic engagement. 
However, this new weapon of the weak is at risk of regression if the government 
implements oppressive bills that curtail the right to freedom of expression. 
Recent developments are by no means unique, in the sense that previous gov-
ernments have also used bills to simultaneously uphold and repress rights. A care-
ful analysis of social media regulations shows that the current government has 
remained ambivalent in its attitude towards freedom of expression too – both pro-
moting and limiting that right. Cyber activism in the country has intensified, and 
individuals, media, and human rights groups have employed the tool to drive pro-
democratic campaigns. Nevertheless, it appears that criticising the government via 
social media remains a risky venture. 
Nigeria has been a supporter of human rights both globally and regionally as 
a signatory to related treaties and legislation. Therefore, it must practise what it 
preaches to ensure that rights are not abused in masking the ills of government. 
Social media, if allowed, could transform from a weapon to a confluence, where citi-
zens and government interact – reporting criticism, collecting opinion, and speak-
ing to the people. Hence bills must be drafted to ensure that these opportunities are 
allowed to exist, to the benefit of both citizens and the state. It must be emphasised 
that a vested interest and willingness on the part of the government is pivotal to 
securing the freedom of expression.
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